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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
This appeal by defendant Wandy Reynoso pr esents a 
question of sentencing procedure. Reynoso pled guilty to 
conspiracy to distribute cocaine and to possession of 
cocaine with intent to distribute. Without af fording pre- 
hearing notice to either Reynoso or the Gover nment, the 
District Court appears to have sentenced Reynoso based in 
part on information that it learned during an earlier 
criminal trial in which Reynoso was not involved. Some of 
the information upon which the court r elied was not 
contained in either Reynoso's Presentence Investigation 
Report (PSI), or the Government's Sentencing 
Memorandum, nor was it brought out through Reynoso's 
testimony at the sentencing hearing. 
 
Reynoso contends that the District Court was r equired to 
give him advance notice that he would be sentenced based, 
even in part, on information other than that contained in 
his PSI, and he submits that this error pr ejudiced him by 
affecting the District Court's judgment as to whether his 
sentencing range could be enhanced on the gr ounds that 
he was an "organizer, leader , manager, or supervisor" within 
the meaning of Section 3B1.1 of the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines. Because Reynoso never raised this 
claim before the District Court, we review only for plain 
error. We may therefor e set aside Reynoso's sentence only 
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if: (1) the District Court erred; (2) the court's error was clear 
or obvious; (3) Reynoso can show that the err or affected his 
substantial rights, i.e., that it prejudiced him; and (4) not 
correcting the error would seriously impair the fairness, 
integrity, or reputation of a judicial pr oceeding. 
 
Following both Supreme Court jurisprudence and our 
own, we hold that before a sentencing court may rely on 
testimonial or other evidence from an earlier proceeding, it 
must afford fair notice to both defense counsel and the 
Government that it plans to do so. The court must identify 
the specific evidence upon which it expects to r ely and the 
purposes for which it intends to consider the evidence, and 
the notice must be provided sufficiently in advance so as to 
ensure that counsel for both sides have a r ealistic 
opportunity to obtain and review the relevant transcripts 
and to prepare a response ther eto. Because the District 
Court did not take these steps, we agree with Reynoso that 
it erred in sentencing him, thus meeting thefirst plain 
error requirement. 
 
Nevertheless, we decline to set aside Reynoso's sentence 
because he has not met his burden of showing that the 
error affected his substantial rights. The District Court was 
unquestionably entitled to consider the testimony fr om the 
earlier trial in sentencing Reynoso; the only err or resulted 
from the lack of notice. The question is not, therefore, 
whether Reynoso's sentence would have been dif ferent had 
the court not considered the additional evidence; instead, 
Reynoso must show that the District Court would have 
imposed a lesser sentence had defense counsel been given 
the required notice. Because Reynoso has failed to point 
out any way in which his lawyer could have or would have 
rebutted or responded to the evidence fr om the prior 
proceeding had counsel been affor ded advance notice, we 
hold that Reynoso has failed to meet his bur den of showing 
prejudice. In light of this conclusion, we need not decide 
whether the error in this case was "clear" or "obvious" or 
whether failing to correct it would seriously impair the 
fairness, integrity, or reputation of a judicial proceeding. 
 






In 1997, Nestora "Nettie" Salcedo and Juan Medina 
contacted the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and 
offered to provide information regarding individuals 
involved in cocaine trafficking. The ensuing investigation 
focused on three men: Reynoso, Gregorio Espinal Mercado, 
and Juan Gonzalez. Starting on June 10, 1997, Salcedo 
and Medina had numerous telephone conversations with 
Reynoso and Mercado regarding the pur chase of a large 
amount of cocaine. These calls were recor ded by DEA 
agents. A controlled buy was arranged, and scheduled for 
June 20 in Philadelphia. The buyer was to be Miguel Morel, 
another DEA informant. 
 
On that day, Reynoso, Mercado, and Gonzalez met with 
Salcedo and Medina in New York City. Reynoso informed 
Salcedo and Medina that Gonzalez was going to drive the 
car containing the drugs to Philadelphia, while the rest of 
them would take another car. Because Gonzalez did not 
know the way, Reynoso explained that Gonzalez would be 
following them. The convoy departed at approximately 5 
p.m. 
 
Around 6:30 p.m., Reynoso called Morel and told him to 
go to a hotel parking lot. This conversation was monitored 
by a DEA agent, who arranged to have law enfor cement 
personnel on the scene. The convoy eventually arrived, but 
Reynoso informed Morel that he did not want to conduct 
the transaction in the parking lot. After they agr eed to do 
the deal at a nearby apartment, Reynoso and the others got 
back into their cars and began to leave. They wer e arrested 
at that point. Law enforcement agents eventually found 





Reynoso, Mercado, and Gonzalez were indicted in 
connection with these events. Reynoso and Mer cado 
jumped bail, and Mercado has never been captur ed. 
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Gonzalez was tried and convicted in the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and 
we affirmed his conviction on appeal. Reynoso was 
eventually apprehended in the New York City area and 
returned to Philadelphia. On December 22, 1999 he pled 
guilty before the same judge who had pr esided over the 
Gonzalez trial to one count of conspiracy to distribute (and 
to possess with intent to distribute) more than 500 grams 
of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. S 846, and one count of 
possession with intent to distribute more than 500 grams 
of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. S 841(a)(1). 
 
The Probation Officer then prepar ed Reynoso's PSI. In its 
Sentencing Memorandum, the Government objected to two 
portions of the PSI. First, the Government submitted that 
the Probation Officer had erred by notfinding Reynoso 
eligible for a two-step Offense Level enhancement as "an 
organizer, leader, manager , or supervisor" of criminal 
activity pursuant to U.S.S.G. S 3B1.1(c). 1 Second, based on 
its claim that Reynoso had been an organizer , leader, 
manager, or supervisor, the Gover nment submitted that 
Reynoso was ineligible for a two-step Offense Level 
reduction pursuant to the "safety valve" contained in 
U.S.S.G. S 2D1.1(b)(6).2 In support of its assertions, the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Section 3B1.1(c) provides for a two level increase "[i]f the defendant 
was an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor in any criminal activity 
other than that described in (a) or (b)." Sections 3B1.1(a) and (b) apply 




2. Section 2D1.1(b)(6) provides for a two-level reduction if the 
defendant's 
Offense Level would otherwise be 26 or gr eater and if the defendant 
meets the criteria listed in U.S.S.G. S 5C1.2. Section 5C1.2 applies if 
 
       (1) the defendant does not have more than 1 criminal history point, 
       as determined under the sentencing guidelines; 
 
       (2) the defendant did not use violence or cr edible threats of 
       violence or possess a firearm or other dangerous weapon (or 
       induce another participant to do so) in connection with the 
       offense; 
 
       (3) the offense did not result in death or serious bodily injury to 
       any person; 
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Government attached eight exhibits: the handwritten notes 
 
of an interview that an Assistant United States Attorney 
had conducted of Gonzalez, and transcripts of seven 
 
telephone conversations between Reynoso and DEA 
informants. Reynoso sought downward departures on a 
 
number of grounds, but did not otherwise object to the PSI. 
 
Reynoso was sentenced on July 27, 2000. Defense 
counsel acknowledged at the start of the hearing that he 
 
had reviewed the PSI and the Government's Sentencing 
Memorandum and accompanying exhibits. After hearing 
 
testimony from Reynoso and oral argument from counsel, 
the District Court found that Reynoso had been "an 
 
organizer, leader, manager , or supervisor" within the 
meaning of the Guidelines. Accordingly, the court decided 
that a two-level increase under S 3B1.1(c) was warranted, 
 
and noted that, as a result, Reynoso was ineligible for a 
two-level decrease under S 2D1.1(b)(6). These findings set 
 
Reynoso's Offense Level at 29, which, in conjunction with 
his Criminal History Category of I, created a sentencing 
range of 87 to 108 months. See U.S.S.G. Ch. 5 Pt. A. Had 
 
Reynoso not received the organizer , leader, manager, or 
supervisor enhancement and thus been deemed eligible for 
 
the two-level "safety valve" reduction, his Offense Level 
would have been 25 and his sentencing range would have 
been between 57 and 71 months. See id. The District Court 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       (4) the defendant was not an organizer , leader, manager, or 
       supervisor of others in the offense, as determined under the 
       sentencing guidelines and was not engaged in a continuing 
       criminal enterprise, as defined in 21 U.S.C. S 848; and 
 
       (5) not later than the time of the sentencing hearing, the 
defendant 
       has truthfully provided to the Government all information and 
       evidence the defendant has concerning the of fense or offenses 
       that were part of the same course of conduct or of a common 
       scheme or plan . . . . 
 
(emphasis added). The Government does not dispute that Reynoso met 
all but the fourth requirement. 
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eventually sentenced Reynoso to 90 months in prison, and 




Reynoso contends that in sentencing him the District 
Court relied in part on evidence that it had heard during 
the Gonzalez trial, and that the court's failur e to give him 
prior warning of its plans to do so was err or. To determine 
whether the first half of Reynoso's claim is true, we must 
carefully review the sentencing transcripts. The District 
Court indisputably consulted its personal notes fr om the 
Gonzalez trial in preparing for Reynoso's sentencing 
hearing. After dealing with some background matters, the 
court reported that it had read the Gover nment's 
Sentencing Memorandum, and stated: "I went back and 
pulled my file on Juan Gonzalez, reviewed my own notes. I 
didn't read the transcripts again. I looked at my notes, of 
course, the Gonzalez conviction was affirmed by the Court 
of Appeals." 
 
The District Court also made several statements during 
the sentencing hearing that implied that it was r elying on 
information that it recalled from the Gonzalez trial, and 
that some of this information had not been r eflected in 
Reynoso's PSI, the exhibits attached to the Gover nment's 
Sentencing Memorandum, or Reynoso's testimony at the 
sentencing hearing. After remarking that the transcripts 
submitted by the Government fairly characterized the 
evidence that it had heard during the Gonzalez trial, the 
court stated that "[t]here was also a good deal more that 
[the Government] did not cite on this," i.e., whether 
Reynoso had been an organizer, leader , manager, or 
supervisor. Later, in response to defense counsel's 
argument that the Probation Officer had determined that 
Reynoso had not been an organizer , leader, manager, or 
supervisor, the court rejoined: "The Probation Department 




3. The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. S 3231. We 
have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291 and 18 U.S.C. 
S 3742(a). 
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The strongest indication that the District Court was 
relying on its personal recollections fr om the Gonzalez trial 
came as the court pronounced sentence. The court stated: 
 
       As I said at the beginning of this, I did have the 
       advantage of sitting through the [Gonzalez] trial and 
       indeed the Starks hearing and so forth, and became 
       quite familiar with the transcripts. And one of the 
       things that was notable about the entire pr ocess was 
       both the testimony of Nestora Salcedo, Nettie and in the 
       tapes themselves was the centrality of Mr. Reynoso and 
       the very matter of fact business like approach in all the 
       conversations about this, when obviously he didn't 
       know he was being taped. Of course, his statement 
       now, he is puffing, this is braggadocio, it seems an 
       invitation to visit never, never land, that I won't take. 
 
(emphasis added).4 Having r eviewed the transcripts, we 
agree with Reynoso that in sentencing him, the District 
Court appears to have relied in part on infor mation that it 
remembered from the Gonzalez trial, and that some of that 
information had not been included in Reynoso's PSI or the 
Government's Sentencing Memorandum or cover ed during 




Reynoso contends that his sentence must be vacated 
because the District Court sentenced him based on its 
recollections from the Gonzalez trial without affording him 
a meaningful opportunity "to rebut [that] evidence or 
generally cast doubt upon its reliability." United States v. 
Linnear, 40 F.3d 215, 219 (1st Cir . 1994) (quotation marks 
and citations omitted). Reynoso's brief primarily 
characterizes this as a due process argument, and a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. As noted previously, the exhibits attached to the Government's 
Sentencing Memorandum consisted primarily of transcripts of telephone 
conversations between Reynoso and DEA informants. The Government 
argued that these conversations showed the Reynoso had been in a 
supervisory position with respect to Gonzalez. At sentencing, Reynoso 
contended that he had simply been attempting to convince the people to 
whom he had been talking that he was more significant than he really 
was. 
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defendant unquestionably has a due process right not to be 
sentenced based on inaccurate information. See, e.g., 
United States v. Nappi, 243 F.3d 758, 763 (3d Cir. 2001). 
Neither the Supreme Court nor this one have held that the 
Due Process Clause entitles a defendant to advance notice 
of the information upon which he or she will be sentenced 
or to comment meaningfully on that evidence. Courts have, 
however, found such rights created by Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 32(c)(1)--which r equires that a 
sentencing court "afford counsel for the defendant and for 
the Government an opportunity to comment on . . . [all] 
matters relating to the appropriate sentence." See Burns v. 
United States, 501 U.S. 129 (1991); Nappi , 243 F.3d at 763. 
We will therefore decide this case based on Rule 32. 
 
Our conclusion that the District Court's actions in this 
case did not comport with Rule 32(c)(1) is compelled by 
Burns and Nappi. In Bur ns, a district court had departed 
upward on a basis not mentioned in either the defendant's 
PSI or the Government's pre-sentencing submissions. 
Relying on Rule 32, the Supreme Court held that a 
sentencing court considering such a step must give both 
sides advance notice of its intentions and ensur e that the 
defendant has a meaningful opportunity to comment on the 
propriety of the contemplated departure. See 501 U.S. at 
138-39. Though acknowledging that the express terms of 
the Rule contain no such requirement, the Court reasoned 
that pre-sentencing notice was necessary to pr otect a 
defendant's right to comment meaningfully on a matter 
related to the imposition of an appropriate sentence, and to 
ensure a "focused, adversarial resolution of the legal and 
factual issues relevant to fixing Guidelines sentencing." Id. 
at 136-37. 
 
In Nappi, we held that a district court had violated Rule 
32 by consulting and relying upon a PSI that had been 
prepared on the defendant in an earlier state court case 
without giving the defendant or the Government advance 
notice of its plans to do so. See 243 F .3d at 768. Observing 
that the logic employed in Burns applied with equal force to 
the situation before us, we held that befor e a district court 
may sentence a defendant based in part on infor mation 
contained in a document other than the defendant's federal 
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PSI, the court must ensure that the defendant has been 
afforded "a meaningful opportunity to address the 
information" contained in the other document. Id. at 764. 
To this end, we held that 
 
       where . . . counsel are faced with having to review and 
       address the contents of an additional document on 
       which the Court intends to rely at sentencing, a 
       meaningful opportunity to comment requir es the Court 
       . . . to provide a copy of the document to counsel for 
       the defendant and the government within a sufficient 
       time prior to the sentencing hearing to affor d them 
       with a meaningful opportunity to comment on it at 
       sentencing and, depending on the document, pr epare a 




The reasoning employed in Burns and Nappi applies fully 
to the situation before us. Were a court permitted to impose 
a sentence based in part on testimonial or other evidence 
from another proceeding not involving the defendant 
without giving the defendant and the Government advance 
notice, the defendant's right to comment meaningfully on 
all matters relevant to sentencing would be seriously 
compromised. Further, a lack of notice in such situations 
would significantly undermine the ability of both defense 
counsel and prosecutors to perfor m fully their adversarial, 
truth-testing roles during the sentencing hearing. 
 
There is an additional reason for r equiring specific notice 
when a sentencing court expects to rely on information 
from another trial: the need to preserve the ability of 
appellate courts to review those sentences. Although "the 
scope of what a trial court may consider in deter mining an 
appropriate sentence is breathtakingly br oad," United 
States v. Simmonds, 235 F.3d 826, 837 (3d Cir. 2000), and 
though we must accept a sentencing court's factual 
findings unless they are clearly erroneous, see United 
States v. Reyes, 930 F.2d 310, 315 (3d Cir. 1991), we still 
have an obligation to ensure that those findings are 
supported by the evidence. Were a district court to rely on 
evidence from another proceeding without specifying the 
evidence upon which it was basing its findings, an appellate 
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court's task of determining whether the district court's 
findings were supported by the evidence would become 
difficult, if not impossible. 
 
We therefore hold that befor e a sentencing court may rely 
on testimonial or other evidence from another proceeding, 
the court must notify the defendant and the Gover nment of 
its intent to do so and must identify with particularity the 
evidence upon which it expects to rely and for what 
purpose. For example, an appropriate notice would state 
that the court plans to rely upon the testimony of witnesses 
X and Y from the Z case in determining whether the 
defendant is eligible for a particular enhancement or 
reduction under the Guidelines, or wher e within a given 
Guideline range the defendant should be sentenced. 
 
A sentencing court wishing to rely upon evidence from 
another proceeding must do two additional things. First, it 
must ensure that the counsel for both sides can obtain the 
relevant transcripts. Although we do not suggest that 
counsel before us was entitled to inspect the court's 
personal notes, we observe that it may be helpful in cases 
like this for the court to read the relevant portions of its 
notes into the record. Second, the court must give the 
required notice sufficiently far in advance so as to ensure 
that counsel have a meaningful opportunity to r eview the 
transcripts (or continue the sentencing so that they can do 
so), and, when appropriate, to formulate a response. As in 
Burns and Nappi, we decline to establish a hard-and-fast 
rule as to how much advance notice is requir ed; the answer 
will vary from case to case, depending on the complexity of 
the sentencing issue in dispute and the volume of 
additional material upon which the court intends to rely. 
Because the District Court did not comply with these 




As we noted earlier, Reynoso did not object during the 
sentencing hearing or otherwise raise this claim before the 
District Court. Consequently, we review only for plain error. 
See United States v. Nappi, 243 F.3d 758, 760 (3d Cir. 
2001). Following the Supreme Court's teachings in United 
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States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993), we may thus set aside 
Reynoso's sentence only if: (1) the District Court erred; (2) 
its error was plain, i.e., the error was"clear" or "obvious;" 
(3) the error "affected [Reynoso's] substantial rights;" and 
(4) the error "seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity, or 
public reputation of judicial proceedings." Id. at 732, 734. 
 
Even though the District Court erred, Reynoso cannot 
obtain relief without showing that the err or affected his 
substantial rights. We undertake what is essentially a 
harmless error analysis, except that Reynoso bears the 
burden of showing that he was prejudiced by the error 
rather than the Government having the obligation to show 
that he was not. See id. at 734.5  The dispositive question is 
whether Reynoso has shown that the error "af fected the 
outcome of the district court proceedings." Id. 
 
In Nappi we emphasized the importance of car efully 
delineating the scope of a particular error before conducting 
an inquiry as to whether it prejudiced the defendant. There 
the district court had violated Rule 32(c)(1) by consulting 
and relying in part on a state PSI that had not been turned 
over to counsel for both sides prior to the sentencing 
hearing. We wrote: 
 
       [I]t is important to keep in mind that the District Court 
       could have relied on the state PSI if it had complied 
       with Rule 32(c)(1). All the Court was requir ed to do was 
       to disclose the state PSI to counsel prior to the 
       sentencing hearing and to afford counsel an 
       opportunity to comment on it before pronouncing its 
       sentence. Thus, the relevant prejudice inquiry is 
       whether, and how, defense counsel could have rebutted 
       the contents of the report, and whether the Court's 
       sentencing determinations would have been dif ferent if 
       counsel had been given the opportunity to do so; it is 
       not whether the Court would have imposed a lighter 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Reynoso suggests that the error her e was "structural" in nature, and 
thus not subject to harmless-error type analysis. See Neder v. United 
States, 527 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1999) (discussing the concept of structural 
error). He is mistaken. See Nappi, 243 F.3d at 770 (holding that 
violations of a defendant's right to advance notice of the information 
upon which he or she is to be sentenced do not cr eate structural error). 
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       sentence . . . in the absence of consideration of the 
       state PSI. 
 
Nappi, 243 F.3d at 771 n.12. 
 
The same is true here. The District Court was 
unquestionably entitled to rely upon evidence from the 
Gonzalez trial in sentencing Reynoso. See, e.g., United 
States v. Simmonds, 235 F.3d 826, 837 (3d Cir. 2000). The 
question is not, therefore, as Reynoso seems to assume, 
whether the court could have or would have found him 
eligible for the organizer, leader , manager, or supervisor 
enhancement had it relied only upon Reynoso's PSI, the 
materials attached to the Government's Sentencing 
Memorandum, and Reynoso's testimony at the sentencing 
hearing. Instead, the question is whether Reynoso would 
have been found eligible for that enhancement had the 
District Court given counsel prior warning that it would be 
considering evidence from the Gonzalez trial and afforded 
defense counsel sufficient time to mount a meaningful 
challenge to that evidence. 
 
The District Court's statements at sentencing make 
reasonably clear that the evidence from the Gonzalez trial 
upon which it relied was the testimony of Nestora Salcedo. 
See supra p. 9. We conclude that Reynoso has failed to 
show prejudice because his appellate brief makes no 
attempt to show that--given sufficient notice and ample 
time to prepare--his trial lawyer might have been able to 
refute or minimize the impact of Salcedo's testimony. We 
cannot presume prejudice--Reynoso must prove it. See 
Nappi, 243 F.3d at 770 ("[D]efense counsel has not provided 
any indication as to how, if given the proper notice and 
opportunity to comment, he could have challenged the 
information in the report in a manner that would have led 
the District Court to impose a lesser sentence within the 
Guideline range. Importantly, defense counsel has made no 
suggestion that the information in the r eport was 
inaccurate or false, or that the Court mischaracterized any 
of the information it cited from the state PSI."); Simmonds, 
235 F.3d at 837 ("Simmonds does not contend that the 
information in his PSI or the PSI's of his co-defendants 
[which the District Court had consulted in sentencing him] 
was unreliable or untrustworthy."); United States v. 
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Knobloch, 131 F.3d 366, 371 (3d Cir . 1997) ("Appellate 
counsel has had ample opportunity since the sentencing 
hearing to review [the testimony of the witness from an 
earlier proceeding upon which the court had r elied in 
imposing sentence] and articulate some basis for believing 
it would have benefitted Knobloch in some way had the 
district court, sua sponte, order ed a continuance of the 
proceedings to afford defense counsel an opportunity for 
further proceedings. No relevant theory of prejudice has 
been advanced in the briefing before us."). 
 
In view of the inability of Reynoso's appellate counsel to 
suggest something that trial counsel could have said or 
done had the proper notice been affor ded, he has failed to 
meet his burden of showing that the District Court's error 
affected his substantial rights. As a r esult, we need not 
decide whether the error was plain or whether it seriously 
affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of 
judicial proceedings. 
 
The judgment of the District Court will be affir med. 
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